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On the strategic choice of spatial price policy:





In this paper, we show that the strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly
crucially depends on the rules of price competition. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that
spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy when the mill  pricing  firm  is  the
leader and the discriminatory firm is the follower. When the leader-follower roles are
reversed we find that equilibrium pricing policies depend on the consumer´s reservation
value. The pricing policy game has two equilibria in pure strategies, either both firms
price uniformly (f.o.b.) or both firms price discriminate, when the reservation value is
low. For intermediate levels of the reservation value, price discrimination is a dominant
strategy and the pricing policy game is similar to a Prisoner´s  Dilemma.  When  the
consumer reservation value is large enough we  obtain asymmetric equilibria in which
one firm prices according to f.o.b. and the other price discriminates. We also analyze
the case of simultaneous price competition and find a mixed strategies equilibrium for
the price competition subgame such that the pricing policy game has two equilibria in
pure strategies, either both firms price uniformly or both firms price discriminate.
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1.- Introduction
There are two general spatial pricing policies: mill pricing (or f.o.b) and delivery pricing.
If the pricing policy is f.o.b. (free on board) consumers pick up the product at the mill,
paying the mill price and incurring the freight cost. Delivered pricing policies are pricing
rules not based on consumers´ picking up the product at the mill. The most common
delivered pricing rules are  basing-point  pricing  and  uniform  delivered  pricing.  In  a
uniform delivered pricing system each firm quotes the same price  to  all  consumers,
regardless of distance. In a basing-point pricing system, firms decide on the location of
a base point and a price at that location (the base price); the price at any other location is
calculated as the base price plus transportation charges from the base point.
1 We define
a delivered pricing rule as any price function other than f.o.b. Note that  a  delivered
pricing policy entails spatial price discrimination.
2
The existence of non-negligible transportation costs can also be interpreted in terms of
product differentiation.
3 In this context, f.o.b. pricing corresponds to a firm producing a
single  variety  of  the  good  and  the  consumer  having  to  adapt  the  product  to  his
preferences  (transportation  costs  represent  the  utility  loss  for  not  consuming  the
preferred variety). A delivered price schedule corresponds to a firm producing several
varieties of the product and being able to price discriminate among consumers (sell the
                                    
1 In some markets delivered pricing policies have been widely used.  Examples of basing-point pricing
policies are the Pittsburgh Plus system used in the steel industry and the Portland Plus system used for
plywood.  See Machlup (1949), Scherer (1980) and Phlips (1983).
2 There is price discrimination whenever the difference in the end price at any two  locations does not
fully reflect the differences in transportation costs;  in other words, when the net price (delivered price
minus freight costs) is not constant.
3 Hotelling (1929).-3-
different varieties at prices that do not reflect the different transportation costs).
Thisse and Vives (1988)  analyze  the  strategic  choice  of  spatial  pricing  policy  in  a
duopoly market with homogeneous product and inelastic demand; they conclude that
f.o.b. is not an equilibrium pricing system and firms will choose discriminating pricing
policies. In fact, a typical Prisioner´s Dilemma arises since price discrimination  is  a
dominant strategy but firms would make more profits under f.o.b. pricing. Their result
also holds when the circular model of product differentiation is considered.
Eber (1997) investigates the robustness of this result by also considering the choice of
location. He shows that discriminatory pricing is the unique equilibrium outcome (in
dominant strategies) of a three-stage sequential game  in  which  firms  choose  first  a
location, second the price policy and, finally, a price schedule. However, when firms
choose  their  price  policy  before  their  location,  mill  pricing  emerges  as  the  unique
equilibrium outcome. De Fraja and Norman (1993) obtain an asymmetric equilibrium in
which one firm prices according to f.o.b. and the other price discriminates in a model
with differentiated goods and elastic demand.
All the above works share certain assumptions on the rules of the pricing game. Two
types of price competition are considered: if both firms have  chosen the same pricing
policy in the previous stage, firms decide price levels simultaneously and independently.
When the two firms choose different pricing policies, the mill pricing firm becomes a
price leader and the discriminatory firm is a follower reacting optimally to the mill price.
The argument for this change  in  the  rules  of  the  game  is  that  when  firms  choose
different pricing policies there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in the pricing game.
In this paper, we show that the result that discriminatory pricing is a dominant strategy
depends crucially on this change in the rules of the game.-4-
Firstly, we show that if the leader and follower roles are reversed so the discriminatory
firm becomes the price-leader, the pricing policy game is a Prisoner´s Dilemma only for
intermediate reservation values. When the reservation value is low,  the pricing policy
game is not a Prisoner´s Dilemma and, in fact, two Nash equilibria in pure strategies
arise in which both firms choose the same policy, that is both firms engage  in  mill
pricing or both firms price discriminate. When the consumer reservation value is large
enough we obtain two asymmetric equilibria in which one firm prices according to f.o.b.
and the other price discriminates. It must be stressed that  the  last  case  is  the  most
relevant given the critical levels of the reservation value.
We next consider the problem when all the price subgames are played under the same
rules:  simultaneous  price  competition.  This  approach  requires  us  to  solve  the
asymmetric (different pricing policies) price subgames allowing mixed strategies. Note
that in these subgames the mill pricing firm charges one price and the discriminatory
firm can charge an infinite number of different prices. As a consequence, the strategy
spaces  of the two firms have  different dimension. Therefore, such a game not only
exhibits discontinuities in the payoffs but also has infinite strategy spaces of different
dimension for each player. We shall show that there is an equilibrium in which the mill
pricing firm follows a  mixed  strategy  whereas  the  discriminatory  firm  uses  a  pure
strategy. The pricing policy game is not a Prisoner´s Dilemma and, in fact, two Nash
equilibria in pure strategies arise in which both firms choose the same policy, that is
both firms engage in mill pricing or both firms price discriminate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the model. In section
3 we describe the problem of the strategic choice of spatial pricing policy and present
some results of earlier work.  Sections 4 and 5 characterize the equilibria of the pricing-5-
policy game under different modes of price  competition  and  state  the  main  results.
Section 6 offers concluding comments.  
2.- The model
Consumers are distributed uniformly along the unit interval [0,  1]. The location of a
consumer is denoted by x and defined as the distance to the left endpoint of the market.
The preferences are as follows: each consumer has a reservation value, R, for the good,
and buys precisely one unit per period of time, from the firm that has the lowest end
(delivered) price, as long as his total payment does not exceed his reservation value, and
buys nothing otherwise. When several firms have  the same delivered price at a given
location the consumer chooses the supplier with the lowest transportation cost.
4 The
good cannot be stored.
There are two firms, firm 1 and firm 2,  that may produce a homogeneous good in the
spatial market [0,1]. Firm 1 is located at the left endpoint of the market, and firm 2 at the
right endpoint. Marginal costs of production are constant and identical for both firms;
for the sake of notational simplicity prices are expressed net of marginal cost.
 The cost of transporting one unit of the good is given by the function t (d) = t d, where
d  is the distance from the location of the consumer to the producer. We will  assume
that R > t.
5 The delivered price at a location x must cover the total (production plus
transport) marginal cost. If firm i  were to price below total marginal cost it could do at
                                    
4 The assumption that price ties are broken in the socially efficient way is fairly standard in literature.
See, for example, Lederer and Hurter (1986) for a justification.
5 This assumption guarantees that the whole market  will be served  regardless  of the firms´ pricing
policies.-6-
least as well, for any given price of the rival, by pricing at marginal cost.
6
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1.- Firms choose their pricing policy simultaneously and independently. That is,
they decide on whether to have an f.o.b. policy or a delivered pricing policy.  
Stage 2.- Each firm observes the other’s pricing policy and they decide their price levels
simultaneously and independently, if both firms choose the same policy. When firms
choose  different  pricing  policies,  we  consider  three  kinds  of  price  competition:
simultaneous, the mill pricing firm as leader (Thisse  and  Vives,  1988)  and  the  mill
pricing firm as follower.
3. The choice of price policy
We solve the game by backward induction to obtain the subgame perfect equilibria.
Second stage
There are several cases depending on the outcome of the previous stage:
a) Both firms price according to f.o.b.
b) Both firms use delivered pricing.
c) One firm is committed to f.o.b. and the other firm uses delivered pricing.
a) Both firms price according to f.o.b.
If both firms have chosen f.o.b. policies, they will select mill prices simultaneously and
independently. The demand for each firm is given by:
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The profit functions are Pi (pi, pj ) = piDi (pi, pj), i , j = 1, 2, j ¹ i. These profit functions
are quasi-concave, ensuring the existence of a price equilibrium.
7 The equilibrium mill
prices are given by (see figure 1): p1
U = p2







b)  Both firms use delivered pricing
Denote as p1(x) and p2(x) the delivered prices of firm 1 and firm 2,  respectively,  at
location x, 0 £ x  £ 1. At  a given location x,  competition is à la Bertrand: with cost
asymmetries if  x ¹   
1
2 
and with the same cost if x = 
1
2
. When x < 
1
2
, firm1’s cost is




8 This implies that in equilibrium
the delivered price at x will equal the transportation cost of the firm located further from
x. Given the previous argument,
9 the equilibrium pricing policies are given by: p1 (x) =
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7 See d’Aspremont, et al. (1979).
8 When firms price according to f.o.b., they are competing in the entire market with only one strategic
variable:  the mill price.  However,  under  discriminatory  pricing, firms compete  at  each  location  x
separately. In this situation, stability of price competition is less difficult than under f.o.b..
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In firm 1’s market area, the end price decreases with the distance to the firm, whereas
the transportation costs increase with that distance: the net price is not constant. In firm
2’s market area, the net price also varies with distance and there is price discrimination.
c) One firm is committed to f.o.b. and the other firm uses delivered pricing
Simultaneous price competition
As noticed by Thisse and Vives (1988), there may not be a simultaneous move  Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. Assume that the mill pricing firm (firm 1) charges a mill
price p1, then the best reply of the discriminatory firm (firm 2) is to set a pricing policy
p2(x) = max{t (1 - x),  p1 + tx}. That is, given the price of firm 1,  p1, then the best
response of firm 2 is to equal the corresponding full price whenever possible.
10 But
note that if firm 2 has a pricing policy p2(x) = max{t (1 - x), p1 + tx}, the best response
of the mill pricing firm is to sell to consumers e-below p1 in order to capture the whole
market. For any p1, given the best response of the other firm, the  mill  pricing  firm
always has the incentive to reduce its price slightly and sell to the entire market.  In
section 5 we solve the pricing policy game by allowing mixed strategies in the pricing
game.
We next analyze the different pricing policy subgames under the three rules specified
above. We start by assuming, as per Thisse and Vives (1988), that the mill pricing firm
is the price leader and the discriminatory firm is the follower.
                                    
10 Recall that according to our assumption if the two firms quote the same price consumers buy from
the firm with lower total delivered cost.-9-
The mill pricing firm is the leader
Assume that the mill pricing firm is firm 1 and the discriminatory firm is firm 2. Given
firm 1´s price p1 the market boundary  ˜ x is determined by p1 + t ˜ x  = t (1 -  ˜ x), which
yields  ˜ x = (t - p1)/2t, since the optimal response of firm 2 is to match firm 1´s full price
p1 + t  ˜ x, whenever possible, that is when p1 + t  ˜ x ³ t (1 -  ˜ x). Profits of firm 1 are given
by P1 = p1 ˜ x and the optimal price for firm 1 is p1
*  =  t/2  with  associated  market
boundary  ˜ x* = 1/4, yielding profits of P1
* = P1
UD = t /8. The equilibrium price schedule
of firm 2 is p2
*(x) = max{ p1
* 
 + tx, t (1 - x )} and the equilibrium profits are
P2
* = P2
UD =     
t










When firm 2 is the mill pricing firm and firm 1 the discriminatory firm we  obtain the
symmetric results, thus, P1
UD = P2
DU  and P1
DU = P2
UD. Given these profits, Table 1
summarizes the possible outcomes of the second stage. Note that we obtain the typical
Prisioner´s Dilemma since P1




UD  > P2
UU  > P2
DD >
P2
DU. That is, price discrimination is a dominant strategy, although  firms  would  be
better under mill pricing. The general conclusion of Thisse and Vives (1988) is that
there is a robust tendency for a firm to choose the discriminatory policy. However, we
show that their result crucially depends on the rules of price competition.
4. The discriminatory firm is the price-leader
In order to provide intuition on the equilibrium outcome, we derive the equilibrium by
construction. Suppose that firm 2, anticipating that the follower may undercut its price in
order to capture the whole market, decides to implement a pricing policy of p2(x) =
max{t(1 - x), tx}. Given this pricing policy, firm 1 would react by setting a price p1
 = t-10-
/2, and firms profits would be P1
 =t /8 and P2








firm 2 might increase profits by increasing its full price up to (or to just below) p2´(x) =
max{t (1 - x), t /8 + tx}. Note that firm 1 would be (almost) indifferent between charging
a price t /2 or charging a price t /8 - e and capturing the whole market. Profits would be
P1
 = t /8 and P2´ =     
t











In more general terms it can be demonstrated that
Lemma 1.- The best policy for the discriminatory firm is to keep firm 1 indifferent
between prices p1
 Î [ pL, pH] (or just prefer  pH), with an associated profit of  P for firm
1.
11
The lower extreme of the interval, pL, is the highest price that allows firm 1 to capture the
whole  market  and  to  obtain  a  profit  P  (note  that  pL  =  P).  This  price  therefore
dominates prices p1 <  pL. The upper extreme of the interval, pH, is the highest price that
allows firm 1 to obtain a profit  P given the rival´s pricing policy and the consumer
reservation value.
Proof. Consider any two possible prices for the mill pricing firm:  ¢ p ,  ¢¢ p  Î [ pL, pH],
with  ¢ p ¹  ¢¢ p . Assume that, given the pricing policy of firm 2,  P P P 1 1 ( ) ( ) ¢ = > ¢¢ p p ,
that is firm 1 strictly prefers  ¢ p  to  ¢¢ p . Given firm 2´s pricing policy, p2(x) and firm 1´s
mill price  ¢ p , the market boundary  ˜ x( ¢ p ) is determined by  ¢ p  + t  ˜ x( ¢ p ) = p2( ˜ x( ¢ p )),
and therefore:
                                    
11 A similar idea arises in the paper of Prescott and Visscher (1977). These authors analize sequential
location among firms and show that when an incumbent firm may choose to locate two outlets in the
market the optimal strategy is to keep the potential entrant indifferent as regards location in the market.-11-
P1
 ( ¢ p ) = P = ¢ p [
p x p p
t
2(˜( )) ¢ ¢  - 
] >  ¢¢ p [
p x p p
t
2(˜( )) ¢¢ ¢¢  - 
] = P1
 ( ¢¢ p )
As a consequence, firm 2 could increase its price at  ˜ x( ¢¢ p ) with no loss of market share
and could increase profits. Q.E.D.
We next derive the optimal pricing policy for the discriminatory firm. Given firm 2´s
pricing  policy,  p2(x),  and  firm  1´s  mill  price,  p1,  the  market  boundary  ˜ x(p1)  is
determined by p1 + t  ˜ x(p1) = p2( ˜ x(p1)), which yields
  ˜ x(p1)  = 
p x p p
t
2 1 1 (˜( )) - 
(1)
 To keep firm 1 indifferent between p1
 Î [ pL, pH] it must be satisfied that
P1
 (p1) = p1 [
p x p p
t
2 1 1 (˜( )) - 
] = P. (2)
By  solving  (2)  for  ˜ x(p1)  and  using  (1)  we  obtain  the  pricing  policy  for  the
discriminatory firm p2(x) = 
P
x
 + tx. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium policies when
P    =
t
8
. The lowest price that allows firm 1 to obtain the profit  P is  pL =  P and, at
this  price,  firm  1  would  capture  the  whole  market.  The  price  pH  depends  on  the





H  + t  =
R, that is xH is the quantity sold by firm 1 when it charges a price pH. It is easy to  check
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Note that given the  discriminatory  firm´s  pricing  policy  p2(x)  = 
P
x
 + tx,  the  mill
pricing  firm  is  indifferent  between  prices  [pL,  pH].  It  is  easy  to  check  that  the
discriminatory firm maximizes profits when the mill firm charges the highest price pH.
12
Therefore the maximum profit that the discriminatory firm can obtain, maintaining  a
profit Pfor firm 1, is given by:
P P 2( ) =      +  x -   - x dx   { ( )}










This profit can be expressed as
P P 2( ) =  ln ( ) ( )[1 ( )]    - + - P P P P x tx x H H H
Given that the pricing policy of the leader must satisfy p2(x) ³ t (1 - x ), since it has to
cover its transportation costs, firm 1 might guarantee a profit of t /8 by charging a price
p1
 = t /2. Therefore, fim 2´s pricing policy, that is P, solves the following problem:
max
P
  ln ( ) ( )[1 ( )]    - + - P P P P x tx x H H H (5)
             s.t.     P    ³
t
8








  >   . The first order condition is given by:
                                    
12 Due to the optimal pricing policy of the discriminatory firm holds the mill pricing firm indifferent
between prices [pL, pH], so in order for firm 1 to choose pH its profits at prices [pL, pH) must be e-below
P. We have to change the discriminatory pricing policy slightly: p2(x) = {
P
x
 + tx- d, for xH <  x £1;
R for x £ xH }, with d  > 0, d ® 0.-13-
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Condition (7) defines the optimal P*(R) as an implicit function of the reservation value.
It is easy to check that P* is an increasing function of R. However, it is not possible to
obtain an explicit expression for  P* from condition (7). For this reason we consider a
numerical approximation. With no loss of generality we  normalize t to be t = 1 and
evaluate the firms´ profits at different levels of the reservation value. Table 2 summarizes
the equilibrium profits as a function of R, so we can approximate the value of  P*that
maximizes  the  discriminatory  firm´s  profit  for  each  R.  We  obtain  the  following
equations of linear regression (where r2 is the determination coefficient) :-14-
P* . . . = - + = 0 15064 0 36548 0 9998 R                 2 r (9)
P2
* = + @ 0 098288 0 36777 1 . . R                 2 r (10)
Note that (9) and (10) provide a very good aproximation of equilibrium profits. When
firm 2 is the mill pricing firm and firm 1 the discriminatory firm we obtain symmetric
results, thus, P1
UD = P2
DU  and P1
DU = P2
UD. Given these profits, Table 1 summarizes
the possible outcomes of the second stage and the following proposition states the main
result of this subsection.
Proposition 1.- If the discriminatory firm is the leader when firms choose different
pricing policies, the equilibrium analysis of the pricing policy game depends  on  the
consumers reservation value, R. (i) When t < R £  R the pricing policy game has two
Nash equilibria in pure strategies: either both firms price uniformly or both firms price
discriminate. (ii) When  R < R <R spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy
and  the  pricing  policy  game  is  a  Prisoner´s  Dilemma.  (iii)  When  the  consumer
reservation  value  is  large  enough,  R  >  R,  the  pricing  policy  game  has  two  Nash
asymmetric equilibria in which one firm prices according to f.o.b. and the other price
discriminates. The critical levels of the reservation value are given by:  R = 1.0923t  and
R = 1.0962t.
Proof.  Given (9), (10) and Table 1, we have three possibilities:
(i) When t < R £  Rthe equilibrium profits are such that P1
UU > P1







DU. Therefore, there are two Nash equilibria: (U, U) and
(D, D).-15-
(ii) When R < R < R the equilibrium profits are such that P1





UD  > P2
UU  > P2
DD > P2
DU. Therefore, (D, D)* is the unique Nash equilibrium
and price discrimination is a dominant strategy.
(i) When R  ³ R, the equilibrium profits are such that P1





UD  > P2
UU, P2
DU > P2
DD. Thus, there are two Nash equilibria: (U, D) and (D, U).
Q.E.D.
Note that when the discriminatory firm is the leader, if t <  R £  R the pricing policy
game is not a Prisoner´s Dilemma and, in fact, there are two equilibria in pure strategies
(and another in mixed strategies). If one firm is committed to f.o.b. the best response
for the other firm is f.o.b. as well. If one firm has chosen to be flexible and produce all
the varieties of the product, the best response for the other firm is delivered pricing as
well. When  R <  R <  R spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy and  the
pricing policy game is a Prisoner´s Dilemma. When R >  R, the pricing policy game has
two Nash asymmetric equilibria in which one firm prices according to f.o.b. and the
other price discriminates. This case is the most relevant given the critical levels of the
reservation value,  R = 1.0923t  and  R = 1.0962t. Figure 2 graphically summarizes the
above proposition.
Therefore, the conclusion of Thisse and Vives (1988) that there is a robust tendency for
a firm to choose the discriminatory policy does not hold when the discriminatory firm is
the price-leader .-16-
5. Simultaneous price competition
The above game provides us with an intuition as to the equilibrium outcome when mixed
strategies are allowed in the simultaneous pricing game. We obtained in the previous
subsection that the equilibrium pricing policy of the discriminatory firm is such that the
mill pricing firm is indifferent between prices belonging to the interval [pL(P), pH(P)].
In order to find an equilibrium in the simultaneous game, we would only need to prove
that there exists a distribution function for the mill pricing  firm  with  support  in  an
interval [pl( ˜ P), ph( ˜ P)] such that the best response of the discriminatory firm to that
mixed strategy is p2(x,  ˜ P) = 
˜ P
x
tx + . Lemma 2 and 3 give us some properties that the
equilibrium must satisfy.
Lemma 2. In the market area of the mill pricing firm the full price of the mill firm at
ph( ˜ P) is lower or equal to the transportation cost from the discriminatory firm. That is,
ph( ˜ P) + tx £ t(1 - x) for x Î [0, xh] , where xh  denotes the marginal consumer at ph.
Proof. If this condition is not satisfied the discriminatory firm might undercut the full
price of the mill pricing firm in order to capture a greater market area.




Proof. The value of  ˜ Pcannot be less than 
t
8
 since firm 1 (the mill pricing firm) can
always ensure this profit. Note that if it charges a price  p
t
1 2
=  then its market area will
never be less than 
1
4
 given that the discriminatory firm must cover transportation costs.
Therefore  ˜ P ³ 
t
8
. On the other hand, Lemma 2 implies that the function p2(x,  ˜ P) =
˜ P
x
  +  tx cannot be always above t(1 – x) (however, the intersection between  p tx 1 +  and-17-
p x 2( ) would be over t(1 – x) and Lemma 2 would not be satisfied). The values of  ˜ Pthat
satisfy this condition are  ˜ P £ 
t
8

















is the highest price that allows firm 1 to capture the whole market and to obtain a profit
˜ P = 
t
8
. From Lemma 2 we  know that the intersection between  p tx 1 +   and  p x 2( )





. Finally if we do not consider the complete interval the discriminatory firm
could always change its strategy in order to obtain more profits.
Lemma  5.  The  following  strategies  constitute  a  mixed  Nash  equilibrium  with  an
associated profit  ˜ P =
t
8
 for the mill pricing firm:






















(ii)  The delivered pricing policy
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  for the discriminatory firm.
Proof. See Appendix.
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The following proposition states the main result of this section.
Proposition 2. Under simultaneous price competition in all the subgames, the pricing
policy game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: either both firms price uniformly
(f.o.b.) or both firms price discriminate.
Proof. The expected profit of the discriminatory firm is given by
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Therefore
P P P 2 2 2 8
3 2 4
16 2




< = ( / )
ln
and from Table 1 we conclude that the pricing policy game has two Nash equilibria in
pure strategies: both firms price uniformly  or both firms price discriminate. Q.E.D.-19-
6.- Concluding remarks
We have  shown that the general tendency for  firms  to  price  discriminate  found  by
Thisse  and  Vives  (1988)  crucially  depends  on  the  rules  of  price  competition.  In
particular, spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy only when the mill pricing
firm is the leader and the discriminatory firm the follower. When the leader-follower
roles are reversed, equilibrium pricing policies depend on the consumer´s reservation
value. Under simultaneous price competition in all subgames, we find a mixed strategies
equilibrium when firms choose different pricing policies and we  demonstrate that the
pricing policy game has two perfect Nash equilibria: both firms price uniformly or both
firms price discriminate.  -20-
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
We seek to obtain a distribution function for the mill pricing firm with support [ , ]
t t
8 2
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      for 
. Given that  the  discriminatory  firm  can  charge  a
different price at each point of the market, we solve the profit maximization problem at a
generic point.
The discriminatory firm sells the product to the consumer located at x if its delivered
price,  p x 2( ), is lower than or equal to the full price of the mill pricing firm,  p tx 1 + .
Therefore  the  probability  of  this  event  is  P p tx p x P p p x tx ( ( )) ( ( ) ) 1 2 1 2 + ³ = ³ -   =
1 1 2 - - F p x tx ( ( ) ), where  F p x tx 1 2 ( ( ) ) - is the distribution function of the mill pricing
firm evaluated at  p x tx 2( )- . So the expected profit of the discriminatory firm at x is











F p x tx p x t x f p x tx
( )
( )
[ ( ( ) )] [ ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ) = - - - - - - = (A1)
where  f p x tx 1 2 ( ( ) ) -  is the density function. (A1) can be rewritten as
[ ( ( ) )] [ ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ) 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 - - = - - - F p x tx p x t x f p x tx (A2)




*( ) = +  is a solution for
this maximization problem. By substituting this value in (A2) we get-21-


















=  (A3) can be expressed as











f z   (A4)
Given that  f z F z 1 1 ( ) ( ) = ¢ , then (A4) is a variable coefficient first order linear differential
equation. It is straightfoward to check from the solution of this differential equation that
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Table 2.- Equilibrium profits.Figure 1. Equilibrium pricing policies when  the mill pricing
firm is the follower.
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* PFigure 2. Equilibrium  pricing  policies  as  a  function  of  the
reservation  value.  The  asterisk  denotes  Nash  equilibrium  with
dominant strategies (Prisoners´ Dilemma).
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